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This paper studies the export decision of risk-averse firms in a model featuring 
aggregate uncertainty and no capital markets. Firms seeking to enter the foreign 
market face a sunk cost as well as a fixed participation cost every period they export. 
Using a calibrated version of the model, I show that firms are more likely to export 
when the correlation between domestic and foreign aggregate shocks is negative and 
when their degree of risk-aversion is higher. Counterfactual experiments show that 
exporting increases the volatility of total sales. 
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Although the volatility of aggregate output has subsided across the world since the mid 1970s, 
it is also true that developing countries have faced substantially turbulent conditions, resulting 
in longer and more frequent recessions as well as larger output declines on average than 
developed countries. A growing literature has emphasized the role of trade openness as a 
determinant of volatility both at the aggregate and sectoral levels. However, the relationship 
between trade openness and firm-level volatility has received considerably less attention. 
Although there are several mechanisms through which closer global linkages can influence 
firm-level volatility, this paper explores the hypothesis that exporting allows firms to hedge 
against downturns in their domestic market. To do so, this paper presents a dynamic model of 
a firm’s decision to export in an environment characterized by aggregate uncertainty. Firms in 
the model are assumed to be risk-averse, which means that they prefer to have smoother 
sales. Additionally, capital markets are assumed to be non-existing, so firms cannot borrow to 
finance capital investment and they are also unable to sell their capital stock in a secondary 
market, which means that investment is irreversible. The idea is to reproduce an environment 
in which the diversification benefits provided by exporting would be highly valuable to firms. 
After calibrating the model to match export participation patterns, I find that firms are more 
likely to participate in foreign markets when the correlation between domestic and foreign 
aggregate shocks is negative and when firms' degree of risk aversion is high. Moreover, I find 
that the export participation is more responsive to the correlation of aggregate shocks when 
risk aversion is higher. These results seem to suggest that exporting provides an avenue to 
diversify aggregate risk. However, after conducting a counterfactual experiment in which the 
foreign market is shut down and firms are precluded from exporting, I find that sales volatility is 
14 percent lower when firms are restricted to sell in the domestic market alone. The sunk costs 
associated to start exporting as well as the irreversibility of investment result in a higher 




Developing countries have on average more volatile business cycles and rates of output growth than developed
countries. They also suer from deeper recessions that occur more frequently than in industrial countries
(Agenor et. al., 2000; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007 and Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). Although there are
several factors that make developing countries highly volatile, a growing literature has emphasized the role
of trade openness as a determinant of volatility both at the aggregate and sectoral levels1. However, the
relationship between trade openness and volatility at the rm level has received much less attention. The
distinction between aggregate and rm-level volatility is an important one since the two can behave in quite
dierent ways, as documented by Comin and Philippon (2005).
There are several ways in which closer global linkages can aect a rm's volatility. International trade
can make rms more vulnerable to external shocks2. Alternatively, if domestic demand shocks are not
perfectly correlated with external shocks, exporters can smooth their revenues by diversifying their sales
across markets, thus improving their ability to cope with downturns in the domestic market. However, even
if exporting has a positive eect on sales stabilization, it is a hedging mechanism that relatively few rms in
an industry can aord to use, given the large sunk and xed costs of selling in foreign markets documented
by Roberts and Tybout (1997), Das et. al. (2007) among many others.
In this paper I ask whether exporting allows rms to stabilize their sales by taking advantage of the
imperfect correlation of demand across markets. To do so, I set up and calibrate a model of the decision
to export for heterogeneous, risk-averse rms that operate in an environment characterized by aggregate
and rm-specic uncertainty and no capital markets. Exporting is costly in the model. Domestic rms that
decide to start exporting need to incur an up-front sunk cost as well as a per-period xed participation
cost. In terms of their investment decision, rms can only nance capital accumulation through internal
funds. Additionally, investment is assumed to be perfectly irreversible. Hence, the only way to divest
capital is by letting it depreciate over time. These assumptions are quite novel to the literature studying
the decision to export. Since rms are risk averse, more stable sales have a direct positive impact on rm
proprietors' welfare. Similarly, the lack of capital markets intends to reproduce an environment in which the
diversication benets provided by exporting would be highly valuable to rms, since the payo from this
strategy cannot be replicated by a portfolio of securities. In summary, I seek to stack the deck in favor of
1Using cross-country data, Easterly et. al. (2001) nd that openness increases the volatility of GDP growth. Conversely, Kose
et. al. (2006) nd that more openness to trade weakens the negative relationship between volatility and growth. Di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2009) study the relationship between trade openness and sales volatility at the level of 3-digit industries.
2Bergin et. al. (2009) show that Mexican maquiladora plants' employment uctuations are twice as volatile as those of their
U.S. counterparts, which in turn are more volatile than those of Mexican non-maquiladora plants.
1exporting as a mechanism to hedge against domestic aggregate shocks.
From a quantitative standpoint the model performs well. Even though the model is calibrated to match
export participation rates, it closely approximates investment moments reported in other studies, such as the
fraction of episodes of zero investment and the higher frequency of investment spikes among new exporters.
The implied costs to start exporting are in line with previous estimates by Alessandria and Choi (2007),
although the xed cost required to remain an exporter is substantially higher than the one they report. The
main shortcoming of the calibrated model is the fact that exporters, both new and existing, sell very large
shares of their output abroad. Arkolakis (2009) and Eaton et. al. (2008) have shown that rms that start
exporting tend to start by selling small quantities, and if successful, subsequently experience very high rates
of growth.
After calibrating the model, I nd that rms are more likely to participate in foreign markets when the
correlation between domestic and foreign aggregate shocks is negative and when rms' degree of risk aversion
is high. Moreover, I nd that the export participation is more responsive to the correlation of aggregate
shocks when risk aversion is higher. These results seem to suggest that exporting provides an avenue to
diversify aggregate risk. However, exporting rms are found to have more volatile sales than non-exporters.
The reason for this is the substantial dierence in the investment patterns of exporters and domestic rms.
Even though the volatility of investment rates is slightly lower for exporters, I nd that they are more
likely to present episodes of zero investment. However, they also present much higher investment rates than
domestic rms when either domestic or foreign demand improves. Once rms have begun to export, they
have the incentive to remain in the foreign market even when hit by adverse productivity and aggregate
demand shocks. This is an hysteresis eect caused by the sunk cost of entry into the foreign market. When
favorable foreign demand conditions return, exporters increase their capital stock signicantly more than
non-exporters, thus experiencing higher volatility of sales.
To gain a better understanding of how exporting aects the volatility of sales, I compare the results
from the benchmark calibration to a counterfactual scenario in which rms are not allowed to export. Given
the same realizations for the stochastic processes for productivity and the aggregate shocks, I nd that the
volatility of total sales for rms that would have exported had the foreign market been available is about 14
percent lower when they are only allowed to serve the domestic market. Both the sunk entry cost to export
and the irreversibility of investment induce exporting rms to increase their capital stock substantially when
either domestic or foreign demand improve. This higher volatility of investment is reected in a higher
volatility of total sales.
2This is the rst attempt to study the decision to export that takes into account the substantial xed and
sunk costs associated with becoming an exporter while at the same time allowing for rms to be risk-averse,
an assumption that seeks to come to grips with the limited alternatives for risk diversication available to
rms in developing countries. While some older studies focusing on the eect of exchange rate volatility on
the supply of exports (Clark, 1973; Donnenfeld and Zilcha, 1991; Eldor and Zilcha, 1987) allow for rms to
be risk-averse, because they do not include exporting costs, the result is that all rms end up exporting,
an outcome that is clearly rejected by the empirical evidence. I show that both risk aversion and exporting
costs are crucial in order to understand the links between trade openness and rm-level volatility.
Previous research has found that exporting has a stabilizing eect on sales at the rm level. Studying
a small sample of rms in Denmark, Israel and The Netherlands, Hirsch and Lev (1971) nd a positive
correlation between international diversication and total sales stability, even though domestic sales are
more stable than export sales. More recently, using plant-level data from the German state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, Buch et. al. (2009) have found that controlling for rm size and productivity, exporters
have lower sales volatility than non-exporters. Campa and Shaver (2001), analyzing a panel of Spanish
manufacturing rms, nd that the investment rates of exporters are more stable than those of non-exporters,
and argue that this is because exporting eases liquidity constraints for rms. In a paper closely related to
this, Maloney and Azevedo (1995) study the export decision of price-taking, risk-averse rms using rm-level
data for Mexico. They nd that export supply is an increasing (decreasing) function of the expected return
(volatility) in the foreign market relative to that in the domestic market. They also nd an ambiguous eect
of the covariance of domestic and foreign returns on export sales. However, they ignore the signicant costs
associated with becoming an exporter, an essential feature of my model. Finally, from a methodological
perspective, my paper is closely related to a small but growing literature studying the dynamics of trade
models with heterogeneous-rms in environments with aggregate uncertainty (Alessandria and Choi, 2007;
Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Ruhl, 2005 and Utar, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the theoretical model, sections 3 and 4 describe the
parameters used in the calibration and the benchmark results respectively. Section 5 presents the results of
a counterfactual experiment in which the export market is shut down. Section 6 concludes.
32 Model
Technology
This is a partial equilibrium model of an industry composed of heterogeneous rms that operate in a monop-
olistic competition environment. There is a xed number, N, of risk-averse rms, each of which produces a










with  2 (0;1),  > 0 and u() = ln() if  = 1. This assumption can be rationalized by thinking of
rms owned by entrepreneurs who work in their own rms and whose main source of income is the rm's
dividends3. All rms have access to the same technology, which uses capital as the only input to produce
the nal good4:
q = ek;  2 (0;1): (2)
where k is the rm's capital stock and  is a rm-specic productivity index that follows a Markov process
P(0j). Capital stock is owned by the rm and is augmented through investment that comes from internal
funds. Since capital markets are non-existent, the rm cannot borrow to nance capital investment. A rm's
capital stock follows the law of motion,
k0 = (1   )k + i; (3)
where i denotes gross investment,  is the depreciation rate of capital and 0's denote next-period values for
the variable of interest. At period t the rm chooses the capital stock that will be available for production
in period t + 15. Furthermore investment is assumed to be perfectly irreversible, which implies that gross
investment is constrained to be non-negative. Caballero (1993) notes that because of the smaller size of the
manufacturing sector and highly volatile macroeconomic environment, secondary markets for capital goods
are particularly thin in developing countries. Gelos and Isgut (2001) provide support for this view and show
that irreversibility is a more important component of capital adjustment costs in developing countries like
3Maloney and Azevedo (1995) note that in developing countries it is common for rm managers to own large shares of the
rms they run. Even in a developed economy like the United States, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jrgensen (2002) nd that around
75 percent of all private equity is owned by households for whom it constitutes at least half of their total net worth.
4Alternatively, one could assume a technology that uses both capital and labor, where labor is a fully exible input. The
results of the model would not change dramatically, but adding another factor of production would substantially complicate
the computational solution of the model, since it would become necessary to include another stochastic process for the wage.
5Thus, investment at t completely determines the production possibilities of the rm at t+1. This contrasts with the model
of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) where there is a market in which rms can rent capital to/from other rms. In this setting, the
amount of output a rm can produce is not constrained by the amount of capital it has accumulated.
4Mexico and Colombia than in developed economies such as the United States or Norway. Given that I am
restricting the sources of funds available for rms to nance capital accumulation, it makes sense to restrict
the secondary market for capital goods as well. The idea behind this characterization of capital markets is
to shut down mechanisms other than exporting that rms could potentially use to hedge against domestic
aggregate shocks.
Firms' output can potentially be sold in two markets: Home (h) and Foreign (f). The dierence between
the two is that it is costly for a rm to sell its output in the foreign market. A rm that decides to start
exporting has to pay a sunk cost sx. Additionally, and independently of its previous exporting status, a rm
that exports in any given period has to pay a xed participation cost fx. If rms only had to pay a xed cost
per-period to sell abroad, the only determinant of the decision to export would be current protability in the
foreign market, which means that if current foreign prots were to fall below xed costs, the rm would stop
exporting. The existence of sunk costs of becoming an exporter makes the rm's export decision forward-
looking. Current exporters know that if they stop exporting today, they will have to pay sx again whenever
they decide to return. Alternatively, they can choose to weather some periods of low foreign demand and
avoid paying the sunk cost. The problem for domestic rms is to determine when to exercise the option
to become exporters. If foreign demand (or productivity) is not suciently high it might be better to wait
until conditions improve. The high turnover rates observed in export markets justify including the xed
per-period cost in addition to the sunk cost to start exporting. Since the Cobb-Douglas production function
assumed in the model implies that gross potential export prots are always positive, not including the xed
participation cost would result in rms never exiting the export market. Let y denote the export status of a
rm, with y = 1 if the rm decides to export and 0 otherwise. Also, let y 1 denote the rm's export status
in the previous period. Then the cost of exporting for a rm is given by:




sx + fx; if y = 1 and y 1 = 0;
fx; if y = 1 and y 1 = 1:
Finally, conditional on exporting, a rm has to decide what fraction of its capital stock,  2 [0;1], to use
to produce for the foreign market. Thus, rms can potentially dier in their capital stock, idiosyncratic
productivity, and export status.
5Market Structure
In each market j = h;f there is a representative consumer with CES preferences over all varieties available
in country j. I assume that the domestic and foreign market are segmented, so rms can charge dierent










where Ij is country j's total expenditure on the industry, j is the elasticity of substitution among varieties
available in country j and Pj is the corresponding ideal price index in country j. Assuming that the number
of rms located in country h constitute a very small fraction of all the rms in the rest of the world, the
pricing decision of Home rms has a negligible eect on Pf. This is not the case in market h, where the












I assume that the aggregate variables determining the demand for Home rms' output, both domestically and
abroad, except the price index Ph, evolve stochastically. In particular, letting Z  [zh zf]0, with zh = Ih and
zf = IfP
f 1
f , I assume that aggregate variables follow a joint Markov process PZ(Z0jZ). These aggregate
shocks can be thought of as country-specic business cycle uctuations, which might be correlated with each















and total prots are given by:
 = rh + y[rf   fx   (1   y 1)sx]   i: (6)
Firm's Problem
An individual rm's state variables can be classied into four categories: 1) endogenous individual states,
capital stock k and export status y 1; 2) exogenous individual states, rm-specic productivity, ; 3) ex-
ogenous aggregate states, aggregate shocks, Z and 4) endogenous aggregate states, domestic price index, Ph.
From the demand functions in equation (4), it can be seen that a rm's pricing decision depends on the
domestic price index, Ph, a function of the prices set by all the rms in the industry, which ultimately
depends on the distribution of individual rms across capital, export status and productivity denoted by
6 (k;y 1;). In the presence of aggregate shocks, the distribution   evolves according to an equilibrium law
of motion  0 = H( ;Z;Z0). Individual rms are not able to infer future values of Ph from their own pricing
decision alone, and as a consequence,   becomes a state variable on the rm's problem. This feature of the
model substantially complicates the solution to the rm's problem, since   is an innite-dimensional object,
making it impossible to track computationally. Moreover, nding the law of motion H is non-trivial, since
it is a mapping from the set of distribution functions into itself.
In order to circumvent this problem I follow the approach proposed by Krusell and Smith (1998). Their
methodology assumes that rms' perceptions of how   (and therefore Ph) evolves are boundedly-rational.
Individual rms assume that the domestic price index follows a relatively simple law of motion based on
a nite number of moments of the underlying distribution  . In particular, I consider a log-linear law of
motion for the price index of the form,
logPh;t+1 = a0;z + a1;z logPh;t; z = 1;:::;NZ; (7)
where NZ denotes the total number of aggregate states used in the computation of the model. Conditional on
this perception, decision rules for capital accumulation, pricing and the decision to export can be computed
by replacing the unknown law of motion H for the distribution of rms with the simplied law of motion
(7) in the rm's dynamic problem dened formally in equations (8)-(10). Using the policy rules, I simulate
optimal prices for a large panel of rms and compute a time-series of the domestic price index fPhg. With
this time-series in hand, I estimate the parameters fa0;z;a1;zg that determine the law of motion for the price
index, updating the previous guess. The algorithm continues in this way until both a xed point is reached
for the parameters and the predictive power of the law of motion for the price index is suciently high. The
algorithm used to solve the model is described in further detail in the appendix.
The problem of the rm can be partitioned into two subproblems: a dynamic one that involves the
decision of whether or not to export and how much capital to use in the next period, and a static one which
entails deciding how much output to produce for each market, conditional on the rm deciding to export.































subject to the law of motion for idiosyncratic and aggregate stochastic processes, the law of motion for the
domestic price index (7), and the restriction that gross investment has to be non-negative discussed above.
The solution to this problem produces two policy rules, one for next-period's capital gk, and the other
for exporting, gy 2 f0;1g. Figure 1 shows the decision rule for capital for both exporters and domestic rms
in two dierent aggregate states for a given level of idiosyncratic productivity. Under risk neutrality and no
adjustment costs, next-period period capital would be independent of current capital. In the case of risk
aversion, the capital accumulation rule is an increasing function of current capital, and is very similar to
the policy rule for a risk-neutral rm with convex adjustment costs. Firms accumulate more capital when
demand is high and when they export. It can also be seen that a rm with relatively high current capital
chooses not to invest at all in order to adjust towards its desired capital stock.
Figure 1 about here
As noted by Baldwin and Krugman (1988), under the existence of a sunk entry cost to access the export
market, a rm needs to take into consideration that in latter periods it can continue exporting without incur-
ring this cost again6. This will aect the expected present discounted value of prots, E[0;Z0;P 0
hj;Z;Ph][v()],
generating hysteresis. So, for instance, if after a positive foreign demand shock a rm decides to pay the sunk
cost and starts exporting, after the foreign demand goes back to its pre-shock level, the rm will continue
to export. The policy rule for exporting is characterized by two cuto levels of capital, k < k, such that
(conditional on the value of idiosyncratic productivity and demand shocks) a rm with a capital stock above
k starts exporting, and an exporting rm whose capital stock falls below k exits the foreign market. This
6Roberts and Tybout (1997) nd evidence of non-zero entry costs into foreign markets for manufacturing plants in Colombia.
They also nd that plants that have not operated in the export market for two years or more face re-entry costs that are not
signicantly dierent from the entry costs faced by plants that have not exported before. This is why in the model it is assumed
that a rm that stops exporting has to pay the sunk entry cost whenever it decides to start exporting again, regardless of its
previous exporting experience. This assumption greatly simplies the solution of the dynamic problem of the rm.
8can be seen in Figure 2, where the value function for the rm is plotted as a function of its capital stock and
previous and current exporting status. The hysteresis generated by the the sunk entry cost to start exporting
has important implications for the volatility of sales. If sunk costs are suciently large, exporters will be
reluctant to exit the foreign market when foreign demand is unfavorable and/or productivity falls. Exporters
that have experienced prolonged spells of low demand or productivity, whose capital is signicantly below
their desired level, have a strong incentive to engage in substantial investment when aggregate conditions
turn around. These dramatic changes in the level of the capital stock of exporters are reected on higher
sales volatility than that experienced by domestic rms.
Figure 2 about here
The static problem of how much output to export, conditional on the capital stock and the realizations of









The key variables that determine the fraction  of capital used in the production for the foreign market are
the relative magnitudes of domestic and foreign demand and the relative elasticities of demand in the two
markets. When the size of the foreign market increases relative to that of the domestic market,  increases.
A higher elasticity of foreign demand also increases  because the optimal quantity to be sold in the foreign
market increases. This is the same reason why  is an increasing and concave function of k as seen in Figure
3. Assuming that h < f, a rm has the incentive to allocate a higher fraction of its capital stock to
produce output for the more-elastic foreign market.
Figure 3 about here
Timing
The timing of actions is as follows, and is illustrated in Figure 4:
1. A rm enters period t with a given capital stock kt and last period's export status yt 1 2 f0;1g.
Demand shocks zf and zh and rm-specic productivity  draws are realized at the beginning of the
period.
2. The rm decides whether to export or not. If the rm did not export last period, it has to pay a sunk
cost sx to break into the foreign market in period t. Regardless of its previous exporting status, the
9rm needs to pay a xed cost fx every period it exports. Conditional on deciding to export, a rm
chooses the fraction  2 [0;1] of its capital stock to devote for production for the foreign market.
3. Finally, the rm chooses its desired capital stock for period t + 1. Prots for period t are realized.
Figure 4 about here
Since a rm's capital stock in period t is the result of the rm's decision at t   1, the timing assumption
implies that output is chosen before the resolution of uncertainty, but the allocation of sales is decided
ex-post. This implies that a rm has greater exibility in adjusting the distribution of sales across dierent
markets than it does in changing the total scale of its production. The same timing assumption is used by
Eldor and Zilcha (1987) and Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991).
3 Calibration
Table 1 presents the parameters used in the benchmark solution of the model. The model period is set
to one year. The coecient of relative risk aversion, discount factor, depreciation rate and the technology
parameter are standard in the macroeconomics literature. The discount rate  = 0:90 implies an annual real
interest rate of 11%, which is higher than the usual 4% based on the US real interest rate. The depreciation
rate is set to 6% annually as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The coecient of relative risk aversion of
1 implies a logarithmic utility of prots. Below I show how the decision to export is aected by changes in
the rms' degree of risk aversion.
Table 1 about here
The elasticity of substitution among domestic varieties, which under the CES demand assumption is also
equal to the price elasticity of demand for individual varieties, is set to 2. Ruhl (2005) argues that a low
value of this elasticity, between 1 and 3.5, is more appropriate to match high-frequency uctuations. For the
foreign demand elasticity, I use the Das et. al. (2007) estimate of a foreign elasticity demand premium of 2
based on a constant-elasticity demand structure for knitted fabrics and basic chemical plants in Colombia.
This is consistent with foreign markets being characterized by stier competition. The calibration of the
xed and sunk costs of exporting seeks to match the observed transition rates into and out of the export
market documented by Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Colombia7. The results can be seen in Table 2. Given
the calibrated values for sx and fx, domestic rms breaking into the foreign market would expect to pay
7Similar entry and exit rates are reported by Alessandria and Choi (2007) for U.S. manufacturing
10on average 12.07 percent of their pre-export sales as an entry cost, and exporters would have to sacrice on
average 7.89 percent of their sales to maintain their presence abroad. The value of the sunk entry cost is
close to the 16.5 percent cost calculated by Alessandria and Choi (2007) based on their calibration for U.S.
manufacturing plants. The cost to remain an exporter implied by my calibration is substantially higher than
the one Alessandria and Choi (2007) report (1.7 percent of total sales). This is due to the assumption of
risk aversion. As can be seen in Figure 2, the curvature that risk aversion introduces into the rm's value
function increases the hysteresis band relative to the case of risk neutrality. In order to match the conditional
probability of exiting the foreign market, a high value of fx is needed.
Table 2 about here


































which allows for contemporaneous correlation between innovations in Home and Foreign through the
spillover parameter a12 and the o-diagonal element of the variance covariance matrix, 12. Since Home
is assumed to be a small, developing country, aggregate shocks in Home do not generate spillovers in the
foreign country. In the benchmark calibration both a12 and 12 are set to zero9. The parametrization of
the variance covariance matrix of innovations,  also follows Kehoe and Perri (2002) but it assumes that
the variance of domestic innovations is twice as large as that in the foreign country, based on the ndings
of Aguiar and Gopinath (2002) that emerging market business cycles are twice as volatile as those in small
developed countries. The VAR process is approximated by a 4-state Markov chain with zh 2 fzh;zhg and
zf 2 fzf;zfg, using Tauchen's (1986) approximation method. Idiosyncratic productivity is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process, independent from the aggregate shocks, and is also approximated using Tauchen's
8This parametrization is commonly used in the international real business cycle literature. See Kehoe and Perri (2002) and
the references therein.
9Kollmann (1996) nds little evidence of spillovers among OECD countries. However, since developing countries' business
cycles are documented to be positively correlated with business cycles in industrial countries (Agenor et. al., 2000), I present
results showing how the decision to export is aected by the degree of correlation between aggregate shocks.
11method with N = 15 grid points.
t = 0:90t 1 + t; t  N(0;0:1) (13)
4 Results
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the benchmark calibration. In the model, rms accumulate capital
when their idiosyncratic productivity increases and when facing high aggregate shocks. As is common in
models that feature xed costs to participate in the export market, rms that start exporting sell a signicant
fraction of their output in the foreign market. On average, foreign revenues account for 45 percent of total
sales for exporters.
Table 3 about here
Table 4 shows that entry into the export market takes place only when foreign demand is high, and conversely,
that rms leave the foreign market only during periods of low foreign demand, with almost all exit episodes
occurring when domestic demand is also low. During periods of high foreign demand, entry into the export
market (extensive margin) accounts for about 40 percent of total exports while exiting exporters account for
24 percent of exports before leaving the foreign market. However, since relatively few rms are close to the
thresholds to start/stop exporting, the share of exporting rms is quite stable across aggregate states, even
though the number of exporters is slightly higher during periods of low domestic demand and high foreign
demand.
At the moment of entry there is a large surge in investment; on average, the investment rate for new
exporters is 18 percent, substantially higher than for non-exporters and existing exporters. This pattern is
consistent with the ndings of Iacovone and Javorcik (2009), who show that Mexican manufacturing plants
are signicantly more likely to present investment spikes10 one and two years before starting to export a new
product. Upon entry into the export market, rms' total sales increase on average by 29 percent on impact,
and although sales fall afterwards, they still remain higher than prior to exporting11. Conversely, domestic
sales fall as rms channel resources into the foreign market in order to recoup the costs of selling abroad.
As a result of the irreversibility of investment, when productivity or aggregate demand fall, rms cannot
divest in order to reach a lower capital stock and are therefore forced to let their capital stock depreciate.
10Investment rates above 20 percent.
11Total sales for rms that have remained in the export market for ve years are about 10 percent higher than their pre-export
sales.
12Because of this asymmetry, about 30 percent of the rms do not invest in any given period. Gelos and
Isgut (2001) report rates of zero investment episodes for machinery and equipment of 28 and 30 percent for
manufacturing rms in Mexico and Colombia respectively.
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Table 5 compares the behavior of domestic and exporting rms. As previously noted, exporters sell a
substantial amount of output abroad and are therefore 64 percent larger than domestic rms in terms of
total sales. Exporters' sales volatility is also 23 percent higher than that of non-exporters. Although mean
investment rates do not dier signicantly between exporters and domestic rms, the investment behavior for
both types of rms is actually quite dierent. As noted by Caballero (1991), in the presence of irreversibilities,
capital stock is more responsive to \good" shocks (realizations in which the capital in place is lower than the
desired stock of capital), since downsizing the capital stock is costlier than building it up. For this reason,
exporters are more likely to present episodes of zero investment than non-exporters (38 percent, relative to
28 percent for non-exporters), but at the same time present substantially higher investment rates during
periods of favorable demand. For instance, when the economy moves from a state with both low domestic
and foreign demand to a state with high domestic and foreign demand, the investment rate for exporters is
23 percent compared to 7 percent for non-exporters, more than three times as large. Because exporters have
already accumulated substantial capital stocks, irreversibility makes them less likely to continue investing;
however, exporters do have the incentive to accumulate capital in response to positive shocks to foreign
demand, a stimulus that does not directly aect domestic rms12.
Table 5 about here
Next, I examine how the degree of correlation between aggregate shocks aects the export participation
decision of rms. To do so, I change the parameter 12 in the aggregate shock process covariance matrix,
keeping all other parameters the same as in the benchmark. This aects two elements of the simulation: the
grid points fzh;zh;zf;zfg for the aggregate shock and the transition matrix PZ(Z0jZ). In order to assess
the eect of the correlation of demand shocks on export participation while keeping the size of both markets
xed, I use the same grid points as in the benchmark simulation and only allow the transition matrix to
change. Figure 5 depicts the results. I nd a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of correlation
of aggregate shocks and export participation. When the correlation between domestic and foreign demand
becomes more negative, a signicant increase can be observed in export market participation. Thus, reducing
12Although there may be some indirect eects through changes in the price index.
13the correlation between aggregate shocks from 0 to -0.6 results in an increase in the share of exporting rms
from 21 to 32 percent. At lower levels of correlation there is not a signicant dierence in the pattern
of export participation. However, when the correlation between aggregate shocks increases above 0.4 the
number of rms exporting increases relative to the benchmark of zero correlation. This might be due to
the higher variance in domestic demand resulting from the higher correlation. Maloney and Azevedo (1995)
also nd that the covariance between domestic and foreign revenues has an ambiguous eect on the export
supply decision of risk-averse rms.
Figure 5 also shows how the decision to export is inuenced by a rm's degree of risk aversion. Lower
risk aversion increases the optimal scale of rms (reducing  from 1 to 0.5 increases the average capital stock
of rms by 11 percent) which would make it more likely for rms to accumulate enough capital to enter the
foreign market. On the other hand, less risk-averse rms would nd the diversication benets provided
by the imperfect correlation of shocks across markets less valuable. The results in Figure 5 show that the
latter eect dominates. Although the non-monotonic relationship between exporting and the correlation of
shocks remains, the share of exporters is consistently lower when risk-aversion falls. This result suggests
that risk-averse rms value the diversication advantage provided by the imperfect correlation in demand
as a mechanism to smooth their sales revenue.
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5 Experiment: Closing Down the Export Market
To quantify the eect that exporting has on the volatility of sales, I take advantage of my calibrated model
and conduct a counterfactual experiment in which the foreign market is shut down, so rms do not have the
opportunity to export. Using the same realizations for the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, I compare
the performance of rms that would have become exporters had the foreign market been open with their
behavior in the benchmark simulation.
Figure 6 shows the behavior of a representative rm that in the benchmark simulation experiences two
long spells of exporting, of 99 and 46 periods respectively. Exporting has a signicantly positive eect on
the scale of the rm. Total sales are 61 percent higher and 22 percent more volatile in the benchmark
simulation during the periods in which the rm would have exported13. Table 6 presents the results for
all rms. Total sales are 36 percent lower on average and 14.4 percent less volatile for potential exporters
13Capital stock is 12.8 percent lower and 45.8 percent less volatile in the counterfactual.
14in the counterfactual scenario. Only domestic sales are slightly more volatile when rms are not able to
export. This pattern can be better appreciated in the upper panel of Figure 8, which shows the distribution
of capital in both scenarios.
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Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the mean capital stock for rms that are about to become exporters in the
benchmark simulation, and compares it with the rms' behavior when the foreign market is closed. The gure
shows that potential exporters are rms that have experienced high productivity and demand realizations
before starting to export. Therefore, even in the counterfactual scenario, these potential exporters are
actively accumulating capital and are signicantly larger than the average rm. However, when productivity
dwindles, rms in the counterfactual let their capital start to fall relative to the case where they can export.
The counterfactual capital stock is 5 percent smaller on average in the rst period after potential exporters
should have started selling abroad than in the benchmark scenario. This dierence increases to 12 percent
after 3 periods and 14 percent after 5 periods. Thus, exporting allows rms to sustain higher stocks of
capital. Due to the export hysteresis generated by the sunk cost, rms remain in the export market even
when foreign conditions are not favorable. Conversely, when demand or productivity improves, exporters
substantially increase their investment and sales. In the counterfactual the lack of sunk costs results in rms
facing smaller deviations from their desired capital stock. This in turn translates into lower volatility of
investment and sales.
Figure 7 about here
The fact that exporting causes higher sales volatility can be seen clearly in the lower panel of Figure 8.
Exporters' signicant reaction to foreign demand shocks on the intensive margin is missing in the counter-
factual scenario. For instance, when the economy moves from a state of low domestic and foreign demand
to a state in which only foreign demand improves, there is almost no change on investment by rms in
the counterfactual. In the benchmark, however, there is a lot of action taking place in the foreign market,
which in turn makes the sales of exporting rms more volatile. Existing exporters increase their investment
rate from 2 to 7 percent and adjust the composition of their sales towards the foreign market, increasing
the average share of exports on total sales from 42 to 59 percent. There is also signicant entry into the
export market, which accounts for 11.7 percent of the increase in total exports. As shown in the previous
15section, entry into the export market is characterized by very high investment rates and large changes in
total sales that are reected in higher sales volatility. Thus, exporters' substantial response to aggregate
shocks, especially on the intensive margin, tip the balance towards a net positive eect of exporting on the
volatility of sales at the rm level.
Figure 8 about here
6 Concluding Remarks
I set up and calibrate a model in which risk-averse rms accumulate capital and choose whether to sell their
output in a foreign market or not. In order to highlight the possible benets of sales stabilization associated
with exporting, I assume that there are no capital markets available for rms, so that the only mechanism
available for a rm to hedge against domestic aggregate shocks is exporting. I nd that the correlation
structure of aggregate shocks is an important factor in determining a rm's decision to become an exporter.
Moreover, a lower degree of risk aversion reduces the responsiveness of export participation to the correlation
of aggregate shocks. These two ndings suggest that exporting could provide a diversication avenue for
exporting rms. However, a counterfactual experiment shows that if the foreign market was hypothetically
closed, potential exporters would have lower sales volatility than if they were able to export. Large swings
in investment for exporters, who due to the sunk entry costs are willing to stay in the export market even
during periods of low productivity and/or foreign demand, and the reallocation of sales across markets
associated with changes in foreign demand that do not aect rms constrained to sell only in the domestic
market, result in a higher volatility of sales for exporters. Thus, I nd that taking into consideration the
signicant costs associated with starting to export and maintaining a presence abroad, two factors that have
been ignored by previous research on this topic, is key to understanding how globalization aects rm-level
volatility.
16Table 1: Baseline Simulation Parameters
Parameter Description Value
 Relative risk aversion coecient 1.0
 Curvature of production function 0.30
N Number of rms 500
fx Per-period xed cost of exporting 0.189
sx Sunk cost to start exporting 0.225
 Discount factor 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.06
h Demand elasticity for the domestic market 2.0
f Demand elasticity for the foreign market 4.0
Table 2: Transition Rates in and out of Export Market
Year t + 1 status
Roberts & Tybout (1997) Model
Year t status No Exports Exports No Exports Exports
No Exports 0.973 0.027 0.918 0.082
Exports 0.11 0.89 0.125 0.875
17Table 3: Summary Statistics: benchmark
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Fraction of Exporters 0.219 0.413 0.000 1.000
Exports/Sales 0.454 0.119 0.194 0.652
Capital Stock 1.578 0.724 0.852 4.733
Domestic Sales 1.425 0.466 0.897 2.512
Foreign Sales 1.086 0.380 0.459 1.975
Total Sales 1.663 0.620 1.112 3.995
Investment rate 0.064 0.101 0.000 0.622
Table 4: Export Market Participation Across Aggregate States
zh = zh zh = zh zh = zh zh = zh
zf = zf zf = zf zf = zf zf = zf
% Exporters 21.27 21.56 24.16 22.50
% Entry episodes 0.00 55.83 0.00 44.17
% Exit episodes 95.51 0.00 4.49 0.00
18Table 5: Statistics by Exporting Status
Variable Non-Exporters Exporters
Mean Capital Stock 1.309 2.541
Mean Investment rate 0.068 0.050
St. Dev. Investment rate 0.104 0.091
Mean Total Sales 1.458 2.393
St. Dev. Total Sales 0.462 0.568
Table 6: Counterfactual Scenario: Shutting Down the Export Market
Benchmark Counterfactual
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev
Capital Stock 1.578 0.724 1.376 0.392
Domestic Revenues 1.425 0.466 1.477 0.467
Foreign Revenues 1.086 0.380 n/a n/a
Total Revenues 1.663 0.620 1.477 0.467
19Figure 1: Capital Policy Rule




















Figure 2: The Decision to Export

















vNN denotes the expected present discounted value (PDV) of a rm that does not export (either at t   1 or t);
vNX is the expected PDV for a rm that did not export at t 1 but exports at t; vXX is the value for a rm that
exports in both periods.
20Figure 3: Export Intensity Decision














Figure 4: Sequence of Actions
Firms start period t with capital 
stock kt and exporting status yt-1
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21Figure 5: Foreign Market Participation and Demand Correlation









































Figure 6: Counterfactual Scenario: Closing Down the Foreign Market
























22Figure 7: Counterfactual Scenario: Capital Accumulation for Potential Exporters


























Figure 8: Counterfactual Scenario: Capital Distribution and Total Sales
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25A Appendix: Computational Algorithm
1. Create equally-spaced grids for the endogenous state variables of the economy: 1) individual capital
stock k 2 K  fk1;:::;kNkg with Nk = 250, taking care that kNk is such that the policy rule for
capital is always non-binding, and 2) the price index for the domestic market Ph 2 P  fP1;:::;PNpg
with NP = 5. The price index is dened in equation (5).
2. Create grids for the exogenous state variables in the economy: domestic and foreign demand shocks
fzh;zfg and the idiosyncratic productivity shock fig
N
i=1 using Tauchen's (1986) method, with N =
15.
3. Initialize the parameters fa0;z;a1;zg of the law of motion for the domestic price index (7).
4. Let S denote all the random shocks in the model (both demand shocks and the idiosyncratic productiv-
ity shock). Solve the problem described by equations (8), (9) and (10) using a value function iteration
procedure with linear interpolation, given the law of motion 7 as follows:
(i) Solve the rst-order condition for  for all values in the grids of the capital stock, shocks and
price index. This is a static problem.
(ii) Initialize a rst guess for the value function, v(k;y 1;S;Ph).
(iii) given the law of motion for Ph, calculate P0
h for all points on the price index grid. Start iterating
over the price index. Call the index of this iteration j.
(iv) Since P0
h does not necessarily belong to P, linearly interpolate v along the Ph dimension. v(k0;y;S0;P0
h)
is then given by by:
v(k0;y;S0;P0






h   Ph;j): (A.1)














(vi) Once that the optimal k0 has been determined for all elements of the grid K, the value of k0 is
determined o the grid points by approximating the value function v(;y 1;S;Ph;j) using linear
interpolation.
(vii) Repeat this procedure until convergence of the value function has been achieved. This produces
optimal policy rules for the capital stock, gk, and the export decision gy.
5. Using the policy rules gk and gy simulate an economy with N = 500 rms for T = 2;500 periods. In




1 h . To calculate k0 o grid points, use bilinear interpolation. For instance, to
calculate k0 = gk(k;y;Sis;Ph) for kik < k < kik+1 and Ph;j < Ph < Ph;j+1, dene:
hk  (k   kik)=(kik+1   kik); hP  (Ph   Ph;j)=(Ph;j+1   Ph;j): (A.3)
Then, the optimal next-period capital is given by:
k0(k;y;Sis;Ph) = (1   hk)(1   hP)gk(kik;y;Sis;Ph;j) + hk(1   hP)gk(kik+1;y;Sis;Ph;j)
+ hkhPgk(kik+1;y;Sis;Ph;j+1) + +(1   hk)hPgk(kik;y;Sis;Ph;j+1): (A.4)
266. Given a time-series for the domestic price index fPh;tg
2;500
t=500, estimate the parameters a0;z and a1;z using
ordinary least-squares regression. If the parameters are suciently close to the initial guess and the t
of the law of motion is good enough (i. e. if the R2 of the regression is above 0.99), stop. Otherwise,
update the law of motion for the price index and return to step # 3. The estimated parameters for
the benchmark simulation appear in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Estimated Parameters for the Law of Motion of the Price Index
Coecient S. E.
a0;1 0.1412 0.0032
a0;2 0.1413 0.0038
a0;3 0.5128 0.0053
a0;4 0.5151 0.0051
a1;1 0.2534 0.0139
a1;2 0.2178 0.0183
a1;3 0.2421 0.0223
a1;4 0.2027 0.0224
R
2 0.9904
Obs. 2,000
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